Philosophical Explanation
Machiavelli famously writes his philosophy for an ideal political structure and strategy. He discusses the fine details of military use, the people’s perception of their leader, how to distribute and organize power, and of many other things in a leader’s arsenal of considerations. Writing - albeit ironically, according to many of his later interpreters - with sole regard to obtaining and maintaining power, Machiavelli neglects the importance of any ethical components to a leader’s deliberations. He disregards the respect of a people’s autonomy, the value of acting virtuously, and many other moral considerations. But he does discuss how to maintain power with explicit and detailed accounts of philosophy. I will be explaining his philosophies in this vein, delving into his arguments for understanding human (his subjects’) nature, registering the appropriate amount of cruelty and love to be balanced to maintain power, relating military action and soundness to the soundness of law, and how to distribute power.
I will begin by discussing Machiavelli’s conception of whether or not a leader should be loved or feared. Machiavelli is very considerate of the prevalence of domestic threats for a leader, or as he describes a Prince. To Machiavelli, a Prince must keep his people in check in order to maintain power - this is not done if the Prince is hated. But Machiavelli also thinks that this is not done when the Prince is loved either. The safe route for the Prince is to ensure that he is feared (The Prince 36). Machiavelli backs this theory up with his understanding of human nature. He believes that humans are innately selfish, and while they admire virtue, they are not so virtuous (The Prince 36). Machiavelli claims that a people’s disloyalty to one that they love affects them in how they ought to behave - but this merely affects them this way. Disloyalty to a leader that a people fear can lead to very real, descriptive and not normative punishment. Ultimately he believes that loyalty by a people for their Prince is not strong enough to keep the Prince secure in his power (The Prince 39). Very intuitively, a people’s disdain for their Prince too makes his station insecure. But if a people fear their Prince without hating him, he will keep his power.
Next I will discuss Machiavelli’s understanding of the best way to distribute and organize power. Machiavelli considers two potential formats for principalities between which a leader can decide. The first of which we will call the Turk model, and the second of which we will call the France model (The Prince 8). The Turk model involves a Prince appointing ministers to work underneath him in the distribution of power and responsibility, and he can dispose of them as he wishes. The France model involves the Prince presiding over a nation divided between barons. These barons receive their station not by appointment but rather by birth, hereditarily. These intuitively are named after nations which employed each system at the time. Machiavelli makes the distinction in his analysis that the Turk model is much harder to conquer (The Prince 8-9). On the other hand, it is much easier to control and maintain when conquered. The France model of course works conversely. Machiavelli does not choose an ideal model explicitly - but he does draw on the Persian downfall to Alexander the Great. In this, he may be implicitly criticising the use of the Turk model - Darius’ Persia was, once conquered, upheld by Alexander (The Prince 10). This example leads me to believe that Machiavelli is more critical of the Turk model, and in turn favors the France model. On the other hand, Machiavelli seems at least in The Prince to be more concerned with domestic threats to power over external ones - in this sense, I would call it inconsistent for him to favor the France model. It seems like being the most difficult to conquer would be his priority. He leaves us with these two models as valid options of value, although if I had to venture a guess I would suggest that Machiavelli favors the Turk model. He seems obsessed with power, and while conquering and gaining power is important, maintaining the power already had would intuitively be of higher priority.
Next, I will delve into Machiavelli’s conception of virtue - namely, when and how to be virtuous. The only reason Machiavelli gives to act virtuously is to seem virtuous (The Prince 33). Consistent with his disregard for any priority but gaining and maintaining power is his disregard for ethics and the importance of moral behavior. That being said, he does suggest acting with virtue and showing virtue for a leader. It is important to appear virtuous to his subjects, but that is not all that Machiavelli says. He claims that some virtues are more important than others in this regard - for instance, bravery is crucial for a leader to keep the respect of his people (The Prince 34). Generosity on the other hand is not. While he does not delve into every virtue this way, he does articulate that a leader should only act virtuously if it helps him maintain his power, and should only avoid vices that would detract from this power if unavoided. This is in line with Machiavelli’s albeit ironic nearsighted understanding of what makes a ‘good’ leader.
Lastly I will briefly explain Machiavelli’s take on the relationship between military strength and sound law and power. First, it is important to clarify Machiavelli’s understanding of the military, and war in general. He does not just see it as warfare in the sense of combat strategy. He includes in his definition of war domestic threats, diplomacy, and other facets of governing. With that being said, I will get into his conception of military preparation in order to keep power. He separates preparations into two categories: physical and mental (The Prince 32). The physical preparations involve the Prince understanding the geography and terrain around and in his territory and having a large army. The mental preparations involve the Prince learning from history. Many rulers have fallen due to error - or as Machiavelli would put it a lack of virtu. Many have also thrived on their abundance of virtu. In this sense, the best mental preparation a Prince can do is to study history and learn from the mistakes and success of predecessors.
Machiavelli has laid out his ideal structure and strategy for a political leader. He has more points to make in The Prince and in The Art of War, but this captures the gist. While ironic, Machiavelli claims that the most important - and really only important - thing for a leader is station security. He must deliberate over when to be cruel, when to be virtuous, how to distribute power, and military action and war. In the end, he gives us his philosophy on what makes a ‘good’ and powerful leader - with those adjectives (of course wrongfully) equated for Machiavelli.
Glossary
Prince: Machiavelli’s hypothetical leader, for the purposes of illustrating a ‘good’ leader in his terms. He uses this to pinpoint the most beneficial political strategies for someone in power, or a figure rising to power.
Virtu: Usually meaning ability or strength, this contrasts fortuna, which means luck. A leader with virtu is well endowed with skill - notable leaders with virtu are Moses and Cyrus.
Fortuna: To contrast the aforementioned virtu is fortuna. Machiavelli uses this to describe luck and being born into high position or station. Essentially, it requires no skill or merit on behalf of its beholder.
War: Machiavelli believes that war encompasses not just combat strategy, but also diplomacy, domestic management, usurping threats, etc. Effectively it pertains to handling the threats to one’s seat upon a throne - including but not limited to battle with other civilizations.
Turk Model: This is one of two power distribution strategies that Machiavelli puts forward as potential models for a good Prince’s use. It involves appointing ministers to rule in a hierarchy and have power allocated to them. But there are no illusions - they are servants to their Prince, and can be disposed of by him. This model is more secure than its alternatives in regards to defense against outside threats of other nations, but once overtaken is easy to hold.
France Model: This is the other of the two power distribution strategies that Machiavelli puts forward. It involves the use of Barons, who are given their station by hereditary authority. They, in this sense, cannot be so easily disposed of. This model is less secure from outside threat when compared to its alternative strategies, but is much harder to maintain once conquered.